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Conversational inference is inductive in nature, requiring 
the listener ,to go beyond the information explicitly given in a 
message. This requirement runs counter to the assumption that 
rational subjects should only operate on the information 
explicitly given in judgment tasks. Rational interpretations of 
messages are guided by hearers' hypotheses about the speaker's 
intended meaning. An attributional model of conversational 
inference is presented which shows how these interpretations are 
governed by conversational assumptions, which in turn are 
governed by the attributions the speaker makes about the hearer. 
The model is then applied to the analysis of experiments on 
reasoning processes in cognitive psychology, developmental 
psychology, social psychology and decision research. It is shown 
that the conversational model can predict how experimental 
manipulations of relevant source and message attributes affect 
subjects' judgments. In conclusion, failure to recognize the role 
of conversational assumptions in governing inference processes 
can lead rational responses to be misclassified, and 
misattributed to cognitive shortcomings
Most psychologists conceive of judgment and reasoning as 
cognitive processes, which go on "in the head" and involve 
intrapsychic information processing (e.g. Kahneman, Slovic and 
Tversky, 1982; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). While it is incontestable 
that processes of attention, memory and inference underpin 
judgment and reasoning, psychologists have perhaps overlooked the 
extent to which these mental processes are governed by higher- 
level assumptions about the social context of the information to 
be processed. On the other hand, philosophers have in recent 
years drawn attention to the extent to which reasoning from 
ordinary language is shaped by higher-order assumptions about the 
nature of social interaction and conversation (Austin, 1962; 
Grice, 1975; Searle, 1969; Strawson, 1952). These higher-level 
assumptions can determine what we attend to, which memories we 
search and what kinds of inference we draw.
Recognition of conversational constraints on inference has 
important implications for experimental psychologists. No 
psychological experiment or investigation takes place in a social 
vacuum. All experiments and surveys are forms of social 
interaction between the experimenter and subject, which 
invariably involve communication through ordinary language. Thus 
psychologists who explain patterns of judgment in terms of purely 
intrapersonal factors such as memory capacity, attention factors, 
memory activation levels, search strategies, judgmental 
heuristics, and so on, may be in danger of committing an 
attribution error (cf. Cheng and Novick, 1990). They may be in 
danger of misattributing patterns of inferential behaviour to 
features of the person, when in fact the behaviour is determined 
by its interpersonal context.
3
In particular, recognition of conversational constraints on 
inference has important implications for the debate about 
rationality in human judgment. Conversational assumptions often 
require us to go beyond the information explicitly given in an 
utterance. A perennial problem for students of judgment and 
reasoning has been to determine whether a "mistake" is due to 
Incorrect reasoning about the information given, or to the 
application of correct reasoning procedures to incorrect or 
"irrelevant" information (Henle, 1962; Johnson-Laird, 1983). Thus 
a seemingly incorrect or inconsistent judgment may be 
attributable to the judge's use of additional information in 
coming to a conclusion. Often the final judgment may be highly 
rational given the subject's use of conversational assumptions in 
forming a representation of the reasoning task.
In this paper I outline an attributional model of 
conversational inference. I show the implications of Grice's 
(1975) analysis of conversational assumptions for attribution 
processes in discourse comprehension. Thus the qualities (e.g. 
knowledge, intentions, group membership) that the hearer 
attributes to the speaker can affect the hearer’s interpretation 
of the speaker's utterances. I discuss the logical properties of 
conversational inference, and their implications for models of 
rational judgment. I then apply the model to the analysis of 
experiments on reasoning drawn from developmental psychology, 
social psychology, cognitive psychology and decision research. I 
show that the attributional model of conversational inference 
organises phenomena found in these diversified literatures within 
a common framework. The attributional model reinterprets many 
"cognitive" phenomena in terms of conversational inference 
processes. In addition, failure to appreciate the role of 
conversational pragmatics may have led many patterns of judgment
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to be wrongly classified as errors.
PROPERTIES OF CONVERSATIONAL INFERENCE 
The inductive nature of conversational inference 
Conversational inference is itself a form of judgment under 
uncertainty. Hearers have to make hypotheses about the speaker's 
intended meaning on the basis of what is explicitly said. For 
example, most hearers routinely go beyond the information given 
to infer that the utterance "I went to the cinema last night" 
would imply that the speaker meant to convey that she saw a film 
last night. The additional information conveyed in this way by 
the speaker is termed a conversational implicature. The 
difference between the literal meaning of an utterance ("what is 
said") and what is actually conveyed ("what is implicated") 
corresponds to an important distinction made by Grice (1968) 
between "sentence meaning" and "speaker's meaning".
Conversational inference thus shares some important 
properties with inductive inference (Levinson, 1983). The first 
is that it is ampliative; i.e. the conclusion contains more 
information than the premises. Just as from observing that the 
first 1000 carrots that I dig up are orange I make the stronger 
conclusion that "All carrots are orange", so the inference that 
the speaker went to the cinema and saw a film contains more 
information than the assertion that she just went to the 
supermarket. Consequently, the conclusions of both conversational 
and inductive inference are both defeasible, i.e. they can be 
cancelled by the addition of new information. Thus, just as the 
conclusion that "All carrots are orange" may be cancelled by 
digging up a 1001st carrot that is brown, so the speaker may 
cancel the implicature that he saw a film at the cinema last 
night by saying "I went to the cinema last night, but couldn't
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get in".
Conversational inference is thus unlike deductive inference, 
where conclusions contain no new Information but simply 
demonstrate what can be inferred from the premises, and cannot be 
cancelled by the addition of new information. Thus the fact that 
Socrates is mortal necessarily follows from the fact that 
Socrates is a man and all men are mortal, and nothing can be done 
to change this conclusion except to change the original premises.
Consequently, in conversational inference, as in inductive 
inference, we encounter Hume's problem, namely that we can never 
draw correct conclusions with certainty. Just as theory is 
underdetermined by data, so hypotheses about the speaker's 
intended meaning are underdetermined by what is said. There may 
be an innumerable number of theories or hypotheses about intended 
meaning which are consistent with the data given and thus have 
the chance of being true. How then do we decide which theory or 
hypothesis is best?
We do seem to have some criteria for determining the 
rational choice in both cases. In fact, proposals made by 
philosophers of science and philosophers of language are broadly 
similar. Roughly speaking, rational inferences are those which, 
as well as being likely to be true, convey the most new 
implications for the least effort. This position is Implicit in 
Popper's (1972) enjoinder that scientific hypotheses be "powerful 
and improbable", in Sperber and Wilson's (19B5) suggestion that 
the relevance of an inference should be calculated in terms of 
the number of implications it carries for the amount of 
processing effort needed, and in Grice's (1975) logic of 
conversation.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
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Grice’s (1975) statement of the co-operativeness principle 
underlying conversation and the four conversational maxims that 
derive from it are detailed in Table 1. Although some theorists 
have sought to revise this approach, e.g. by reducing all the 
maxims to a superordinate one of relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 
1986), Grice's approach is adopted here because of its ability, 
when suitably interpreted, to explain a wide range of phenomena 
in conversational pragmatics (see Brown and Levinson, 1987; 
Levinson, 1983; 1987; for more detailed discussion). In 
particular, as will be shown below, the co-operativeness 
principle and the subordinate maxims seem to correspond to 
important psychological dimensions, and tensions between them to 
produce important logical and linguistic consequences.
Attributional bases of Grice's logic of conversation
As well as capturing important properties of discourse, 
Grice's (1975) assumption of co-operativeness and the 
corresponding maxims of conversation seem to correspond to 
important psychological distinctions (see Table 2). In
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
particular, the assumption of co-operativeness presupposes that 
utterances are produced by an intentional agent who wishes to co­
operate with us, and has the ability to realize this intention. 
From these basic assumptions of intentionality and co­
operativeness, several consequences follow.
Thus, the maxim of gualitv concerns the likely truth-value 
of an utterance. If the hearer attributes properties such as 
sincerity, reliability and knowledgeability to the speaker, then 
the hearer may well consider the probable truth-value of an 
utterance to be high. If, on the other hand, the hearer considers 
the speaker to be insincere, unreliable or unknowledgeable, then
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the hearer may well consider the probable truth of the utterance 
to be low.
The maxim of quantity concerns the perceived informativeness 
of an utterance. Speakers should not burden hearers with 
information they are already likely to know. What speakers and 
hearers take for granted may in part depend on perceptions of 
class membership. Competent members of Western society do not 
need to be told why a customer who ate a good meal with good 
service in a restaurant left a big tip. From their own world 
knowledge they are able to make the necessary bridging inferences 
(Clark and Haviland, 1974; Schank and Abelson, 1977). Thus 
hearers will often go beyond the information given in making 
inferences, since they assume that relevant information that they 
are likely to know already has been omitted.
The maxim of relevance enjoins speakers to mention 
information that is relevant to the goals of the interaction. 
Hearers are entitled to assume that any relevant information 
which they are not likely to know will have been included. They 
are also entitled to assume that information which has been 
included is relevant. Otherwise why mention it? One problem for 
experimental research is that psychologists routinely violate 
this assumption by introducing information precisely because it 
is irrelevant to the judgment task in hand (e.g. Nisbett, Zukier 
and Lemley, 1980). If hearers (subjects) continue to attribute 
essentially co-operative intentions to speakers (experimenters) 
then they are liable to be misled by the information given.
The maxim of manner enjoins speakers to be brief, orderly, 
clear and unambiguous. The extent to which speakers can adhere to 
these prescriptions often depends on their control of the 
language. Hearers may take this into account in interpreting 
utterances. For example, a German tourist in England might
conceivably ask a passerby for directions to "the Townhouse" when 
she meant "the Town Hall". Rather than direct the tourist to the 
nearest renovated Georgian Yuppie residence in the centre of 
town, a co-operative hearer might attribute the speaker's 
unclarity to her inexperience in British English and direct her 
to the Town Hall. Usually such misunderstandings in conversation 
can be corrected through discussion. However, such opportunities 
for repair do not exist in experimental and survey research. 
Consequently, experimenters may not notice ambiguities in their 
response formats which are systematically re-interpreted by 
subjects, thus leading to systematic biases in the results 
obtained. This seems to have been the case in much basic 
attribution research.
Attributions in utterance interpretation
The trade-off between the maxims of quality and quantity 
implies that speakers should try and be as informative as 
possible without running the (undue) risk of being false. This 
results in important issues of interpretation. The 
interpretations hearers choose may in large part depend on 
attributions they have made about the speaker. To illustrate, the 
utterance:
1. "Some of the policemen beat up the protester"
could convey one of two different implicatures. It could mean one 
of the following:
2. "Some of the policemen beat up the protester" (but the 
speaker knows that not all of them did).
3. "Some of the policemen beat up the protester" (but the 
speaker does not know whether all of them did).
Levinson (1983) characterises the first implicature as a K-
implicature (because the speaker knows that the stronger
assertion is not the case) and the second a P-implicature
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(because the stronger assertion is possible , due to the 
speaker's lack of knowledge). One may reasonably surmise that the 
hearer is more likely to draw the K-implicature if he or she 
considers the speaker to be very knowledgeable about the topic 
(e.g. an eye-witness who was there) than not (e.g. a person 
reporting the incident at second or third-hand).
However, in some circumstances the hearer may not draw the 
K-implicature even if he or she assumes that the speaker is 
indeed knowledgeable about the event under discussion. Such would 
be the case if the speaker were a police spokesman at a press 
conference who wished to limit perceptions of police brutality in 
a critical public. The spokesman may not want to tell lies, thus 
observing the maxim of quality, but may only commit himself to 
the weakest possible statement about police intransigence that is 
consistent with evidence known to the public. If the hearer 
attributes non-cooperativeness of this kind to the speaker, then 
the hearer may assume that the spokesman may be seeking to avoid 
committing himself to stronger statements that would be relevant, 
but damaging to presentational goals that the police force might 
have.
It is not difficult to think of other factors that might 
affect the interpretation of such statements. For example, if the 
hearer knows that the speaker is a foreigner with a limited 
control of English and who did not know words such as "A few" or 
"many" which the speaker might reasonably have used to specify 
the proportion of policemen involved, then the hearer might treat 
"some" as being vague, and consistent with either a low or high 
proportion of policemen.
In sum, the full meaning of utterances needs to be 
determined by reference to context (cf. Shanon, 1988). There is
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more to what is said than what is literally expressed. Hearers 
are required to go beyond the information given in order to 
understand what is said. This leads to a problem which hypothesis 
about the speaker's intended meaning to select. Selection can be 
constrained by reference to Grice’s (1975) maxims, whose 
application is in turn constrained by attributions that the 
hearer may have made about the speaker. Conversational inference 
is therefore inductive in nature, which thus poses severe 
problems in assessing the rationality of judgments made on the 
basis of experiments using verbal materials. This will be 
discussed in further detail below.
Rationality and the interpretation of the judgment task
It is often pointed out that widely shared assumptions about 
co-operative communication (Grice, 1975; Levinson, 1983) license 
interpretations of the experimental task that the experimenter 
may not have intended. Much criticism of experiments on 
rationality has been directed to the question of how subjects 
interpret the information that they are given in such experiments 
(e.g. Adler, 1984; Cohen, 1981; Donaldson, 1978; 1982; Funder, 
1987; Hilton, 1990; Kruglanski and Ajzen, 1983; MacDonald, 1986; 
Markus and Zajonc, 1985; Rommetveit, 1978).
To take a simple example, reported in Cohen (1980). Some 
years ago, psychologists became interested in the logical 
reasoning abilities of peasants. In an experiment, some peasants 
were given syllogisms which stated a major premise and a minor 
premise, as below:
Major premise: If Diego has a plough, then he will sow his
corn
Minor premise: Diego does not have a plough
The experimenters expected the subjects to draw the conclusion
that Diego would not sow corn if he did not have a plough.
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However, the peasant subjects disagreed. They concluded that 
Diego would surely borrow a plough from a neighbour if he did not 
have one himself.
The peasants' response is only irrational if we expect them 
only to operate on the information given, and not to use their 
world knowledge to evaluate the task in a realistic context. 
However, it is crucial to note that this criterion of rationality 
- not to go beyond the information given in what is explicitly 
stated in making judgments - is quite at variance with the 
requirement of rational communication that we should go beyond 
the information given in interpreting what is said to us. In this 
latter view, part of the inferential task is how to decide what 
implicit information is relevant is relevant to interpreting what 
is said (e.g. Levinson, 1983; 1987; Sperber and Wilson, 1986).
This tension between "scientific" rationality, whereby the 
judge should apply normative rules of inference to draw the 
"logical" conclusion from the information given, and 
"conversational" rationality, which requires the listener to go 
beyond the information given, provides the focus of this paper. 
Put simply, the subject in experiments on judgments in reasoning 
is usually a listener as well as a judge. Since the use of verbal 
vignettes or verbal instructions is widespread in experiments on 
judgment and reasoning, the implications for such research of the 
properties of conversational inference warrant serious and 
systematic consideration. Below we review how the hearer's 
attributions about the speaker guide judgment through influencing 
the subject's interpretation of experimenter-given information.
ATTRIBUTIONS ABOUT THE EXPERIMENTER AND CONVERSATIONAL 
INFERENCE
Social psychological research quite clearly suggests that
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subjects attribute serious purposes even to patently absurd 
experiments (Orne, 1962), and to behave in a highly co-operative 
manner in response to some very questionable experimental demands 
when they perceive the experimenter as being authoritative 
(Milgram, 1974). In addition, it is well known that source 
attributes such as expertise, credibility and prior attitude 
affect subjects' responses to experimental attempts at belief 
change (e.g. McGuire, 1968). Consequently, the question of how 
subjects' perception of the experimenter him/herself affects the 
kind of inferences the subject draws about the experimental task 
in hand should be considered in detail.
In fact, the hearer's perception of the speaker is quite 
central to Grice's model of conversation. For example, the 
higher-order co-operativeness principle explicitly enjoins the 
hearer to assume that the speaker is being co-operative, and draw 
inferences accordingly. The lower-order maxims of conversation 
make implicit references to particular attributes of the speaker. 
These may include his honesty and credibility (the maxim of 
quality), his knowledgeability about what may be taken for 
granted in a conversation (the maxim of quantity), his 
conversational purposes (the maxim of relevance) and his control 
of the language (the maxim of manner). As will be shown below, 
factors which may affect these assumptions may affect the 
responses subjects make to experimental tasks.
The assumption of intentionalitv and conversational 
inference.
The most fundamental assumption we make in hearing 
conversation is that utterances are intentionally produced by the 
speaker. If they were not, there would be no basis for making 
judgements about the credibility, informativeness, purpose or
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style of what is said on the basis of perceptions of the speaker. 
Conversation is a form of action, and if the actions performed 
are not perceived as being intentional in nature, then we cannot 
attribute those actions to inferred or known dispositions of the 
actor (cf. Jones and Davis, 1965).
Unless told otherwise, subjects seem to be very resistant to 
attributing experimental manipulations to the operation of random 
or accidental processes. Subjects are very liable to perceive 
palpably random behavior in experiments as if they were guided by 
intentions. Examples are the description of the random movement 
of dots in a film in terms of intentional actions such as "chase" 
and "follow" by 49 out of 50 of Heider and Simmel's (1944) 
subjects. Oatley and Yuill (1984) found that cues such as 
"jealous husband" led subjects to exert considerable ingenuity in 
explaining why the dots in Heider and Simmel's (1944) film moved 
as they did. Perhaps most germane to the present issue is the 
behavior of naive users of Weizenbaum's ELIZA system. Although 
ELIZA produces some rather stereotyped examples of therapeutic 
discourse through the operation of an English language generator 
coupled with some random response selectors and a few procedures 
for recognizing key words, users are very prone to read deep 
intentions into the program's utterances (Boden, 1977).
People appear to distinguish between behavior that is 
produced by a person and some impersonal agent. For example, 
Faucheux and Moscovici (1968) showed that subjects' strategies in 
an experimental game were affected by information indicating that 
their partner was a person or "nature". Subjects' behavior often 
appears to be determined by subjects' perceptions of the 
experimenter's intentions and goals, a fact that has caused some 
to question the usefulness for psychology of experimental 
procedures drawn from natural science (e.g. Harre and Secord,
14
1972).
Consequently, factors which undermine the perception that 
the actions performed by the experimenter are intentional may, 
according to the conversational model, have critical effects on 
how experimental manipulations are interpreted and responded to. 
One consequence of this phenomenon is that "biases" in judgment 
that are in fact attributable to processes of conversational 
inference may disappear or be attenuated when the assumption of 
intentionality is undermined. As will be shown below, this often 
seems to be the case.
"Accidental1 and intentional transformations in conservation 
experiments
The procedures devised by Piaget to test children's ability 
to conserve quantities such as number and mass (Piaget and 
Inhelder, 1969) have been very widely employed in developmental 
psychology. For purposes of exposition, one of the procedures 
used to test conservation of number will be considered in detail. 
For example, a child may be shown two rows of four counters which 
are equal in length. The child is asked whether there is more in 
one row rather than the other, or whether they are the same. 
Typically, the child agrees that they are the same. The 
experimenter then modifies one of the rows so that the same four 
counters are now arranged in a longer row, and repeats the 
question. Commonly, the child will reply that there is "more" in 
the longer row. This is taken to imply that the child has failed 
to conserve the number of counters, and has perhaps confused 
length with number.
However, note that the traditional Piagetian procedure 
involves an obviously calculated and deliberate transformation of 
the experimental array by the experimenter. Children may
15
therefore have made the inference that the transformation was 
meant to be significant in some way. For example, they may have 
recognized that the two rows still had the same number of 
counters, but may have decided that the experimenter is 
interested in determining whether the child has recognized that 
the length dimension has been changed. Children may therefore 
have re-interpreted the question focus from "number" to "length" 
in order to give the experimental manipulation relevance (cf. 
Donaldson, 1982).
McGarrigle and Donaldson (1974) tested the above hypothesis 
by effecting the transformation "accidentally". Specifically, 
after the child had been shown the two rows of counters and asked 
which one had more, a "naughty teddy" was introduced who 
"accidentally" disturbed the length of one of the rows in the 
process of "spoiling the game". Of course, the teddy's behavior 
was carefully contrived to transform the length of counters 
exactly as much as the experimenter did in the normal procedure. 
Although the transformation was objectively the same, children's 
performance in the "accidental" condition was vastly superior to 
that obtained in the "intentional condition". Using one criterion 
of conservation, 50 of the 80 children aged between 4 and 6 years 
showed conservation in the "accidental" condition, whereas only 
13 showed conservation in the "intentional" condition.
This result has been replicated and extended to other 
Piagetian conservation procedures (see Donaldson, 1982, for a 
review). Moreover, it is consistent with other studies which 
suggest that children only judge the shorter line as having 
"more" when they have been asked to make an initial judgment when 
the two lines were equal (Rose and Blank, 1974). Clearly, when 
the array has been transformed, and the question asked again, 
children seem to experience a demand to change their response,
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and may re-interpret the question. When children were not asked 
to make an initial commitment before the transformation, they 
were more likely to give correct answers to the question asked 
after the transformation.
Siegal, Waters and Dunwiddy (1988) extended these results by 
investigating whether 4- 5- and 6-year old children are aware of 
how demand effects may affect responses. They showed children a 
puppet doing a conservation task. In one condition the puppet 
underwent the one-question procedure of Rose and Blank (1974) and 
in the other, the two-question procedure. They found that 
children attributed children's incorrect responses in the two- 
question task to external factors (e.g. "to please someone 
else"), but the same responses in the one-question task to 
internal factors (e.g. "because they really thought it was 
true"). Children thus seem to be aware of the role of social 
pressures in determining responses in such experiments.
In sum, As Donaldson (1982) notes, such results are 
consistent with Grice's (1968) distinction between sentence- 
meaning (what the sentence "literally" means) and speaker's 
meaning (what the sentence means when interpreted in its context 
of use). Although Donaldson (1982) is careful to note that many 
non-conserving responses are still made in the "accidental" 
condition, she also notes that conventional conservation 
procedures seriously underestimate children's ability to 
conserve. In particular, many failures to conserve which have 
been attributed to cognitive deficits such as "perceptual 
domination" (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969) or "attentional deficits" 
(Gelman, 1972) may simply reflect the operation of generally 
adaptive principles of conversational inference.
Intentional and "random" presentations of information in
17
base-rate experiments
One of the most widely known studies on decision-making has 
been the "engineers and lawyers" problem introduced by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1973), and described in a Science article (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974). Berkeley and Humphreys (1982) found that the 
Science article was cited 227 times between 1975 and 1980, with 
approximately one fifth of the citations coming from sources 
outside of psychology, all of which used the citation to support 
the claim that people are poor decision-makers.
Kahneman and Tverky's (1973) basic finding was that subjects 
were more likely to rely on individuating information about the 
target than base-rate information. For example, subjects in some 
conditions were told that the target person "shows no interest in 
political and social issues and spends most of his free time on 
his many hobbies which include home carpentry, sailing, and 
mathematical puzzles". These people predicted that the target 
person is probably an engineer, regardless of whether they had 
been told whether there were 30 or 70 engineers in the sample. 
Kahneman and Tversky attributed this pattern of judgment to the 
operation of the "representativeness heuristic", i.e. subjects 
based their decision about the probability that the target was an 
engineer on the similarity of the target to their stereotype of 
engineers.
However, evidence has since to come to hand that this 
phenomenon of "underuse of base-rate information" is restricted 
to "word problems" in which the base-rate Information is 
presented verbally to subjects. Thus studies which present base- 
rate information on-line to subjects in the form of learning 
trials, show that subjects can use base-rate information 
appropriately when making judgments (Christensen-Szalanski and 
Beach, 1982; Medin and Edelson, 1988). Other studies which
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require subjects to make judgments in which they have prior real- 
world experience or expertise also find no tendency to 
underutilise base-rate information (e.g. Wallsten, Fillenbaum and 
Cox, 1966; Weber et al., 1990; Weber and Hilton, in press; see 
also the discussion of attribution research below). 
Consequently, subjects' use of the representativeness heuristic 
may be governed by contextual factors, such as the assumptions 
that subjects make about verbally presented base-rate 
information.
In fact, subjects' use of base-rate information has been 
shown to be affected by various pragmatic factors. Li, Krosnick 
and Lehman (1969) noted that subjects always read individuating 
information first and base-rate information second in Kahneman 
and Tversky's (1973) procedure and other similar ones. They 
hypothesised that the order of presentation of information may 
have served as a cue to subjects to weight the initial 
information more and the later information less. Consistent with 
this reasoning they found that subjects used the base-rate 
information more when it was presented first. Li et al. (1989) 
also took memory measures and were able to rule out the 
hypothesis that the greater weighting of earlier information was 
due to enhanced recall at the time of judgment.
If subjects were indeed using order of presentation as a cue 
to determine the intended relevance of the information, then the 
significance of the cue should be invalidated if the subject 
believes that it has not been intentionally produced by the 
experimenter. And this indeed appears to be the case; Li et al. 
(1989) found that the order effect disappeared when subjects were 
told that the order of presentation had been randomly determined.
Ginossar and Trope (1987 Expt. 6) presented the engineers
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and lawyers problem to subjects as if the information had been 
generated as part of a card game. Framing the description as 
having been produced by a "game of chance" would undermine the 
assumption that the information was produced as part of an 
intentional communication. Consistent with the conversational 
model, it was found that subjects were more likely to use base- 
rate information in this condition.
Schwarz et al. (in press) employed a related manipulation to 
undermine the assumption of intentionality. They told subjects 
that the individuating information had either been produced by a 
panel of psychologists or statisticians who had conducted the 
original set of interviews with the sample of engineers and 
lawyers, or had been drawn randomly from the psychologists' or 
statisticians' files by a computer. In all cases, subjects were 
given the personality description that is "representative" of an 
engineer, and were told that there were 30 engineers in the 
sample of 100 . When told in the psychology condition that the 
individuating information had been given them by a human 
researcher, subjects on average estimated the probability that 
the target was an engineer was .76, replicating Kahneman and 
Tversky's (1973) original findings. However, when told that the 
statements had been drawn at random from the psychologists' file 
by a computer, subjects' average estimate was .40, in line with 
the normative use of base-rate information.
On the other hand, in the "statistics" condition, subjects 
were more likely to weight individuating information when it was 
drawn at random by a computer from a larger sample of descriptive 
information (.74) than when it was written by a non-specified 
"researcher" (.55). One possible explanation is that random 
sampling is a valued procedure in a statistics framework, and 
subjects therefore attached greater significance to the
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"representative" (i.e. randomly selected) information here. 
Although this explanation is post hoc, it does underscore the 
importance of attention to subjects' inferences about the 
particular expertise and credibility possessed by the source of 
information. As will be shown below, explicit information about 
the source does indeed affect subjects' judgments in this task.
Source attributes and the use of base-rate information
Grice's (1975) maxim of quality enjoins speakers not to say 
what they know to be false, or at least not to say what they lack 
adequate evidence for. Consequently, varying the credibility of 
the speaker should affect the weight attached to the speaker's 
messages. Ginossar and Trope (1987, Experiment 5) varied the 
credibility of the source of information in the engineers and 
lawyers problem. They found that subjects rated the personality 
description as having the highest probability of being true whan 
the source was a trained psychologist (M=.78), lowest when the 
source was a palm reader (M=.31) and intermediate when the source 
was a beginning interviewer (M=.59).
Although Ginossar and Trope (1987) discuss these results in 
the terminology of "rule activation", "accessibility" and 
"mismatching'’, unlike Li et al. (1989) they took no measures such 
as salience or availability in any of their experiments which 
explicitly addressed such cognitive hypotheses. Interestingly, 
their "salience" manipulations which led to greater use of base- 
rate information both involved violations of conversational 
norms, either by presenting prior tasks with uninformative 
nondiagnostic information before the target task (Expt. 1) or by 
rewriting the target task in a "list" style uncharacteristic of 
normal "conversational" communication (Expt. 2). Consequently, 
their results may also be treated as just as consistent with a
21
conversational model which suggests that the weighting of 
individuating information is based on inferences about the 
Gricean quality of that information based on perceptions of the 
source.
In related vein, Zukier and Pepitone (1984 Expt. 1) enjoined 
their subjects to either behave like clinicians or scientists in 
making judgments. Thus when the task was framed as being one of 
"clinical judgment", subjects were asked to call on their 
"general knowledge, sensitivity and empathy" in understanding 
"the individual's personality, profession and interests" (p. 
353). Although not discussed in Gricean terms, these instructions 
clearly invite subjects to stretch the maxim of quality and say 
what, in other circumstances, they might feel they lack evidence 
for. On the other hand, the instruction in the "scientist" 
condition to behave like "a scientist analyzing data" seems to 
enjoin subjects to be strict with the maxim and quality, and not 
to say what they lack adequate evidence for. As might be 
expected, the results showed that subjects are more likely to 
weight individuating information in the "clinical" condition than 
in the "scientist" condition. Interestingly, subjects in the 
"scientist" condition gave lower probability estimates overall 
for both the stereotypic and neutral personality descriptions. 
This would be consistent with a general orientation towards 
caution, consistent with'a strict application of the maxim of 
quality.
In sum, the above studies on the engineers and lawyers 
problem suggest that subjects’ use of base-rate information is 
governed by their assumptions about its conversational quality 
and relevance. When subjects' assumptions about the 
intentionality, relevance and quality of the information are 
undermined, subjects tend to use base-rate information more
22
(Ginossar and Trope, 1987; Li et al., 1989; Schwarz et al., in 
press; Trope and Ginossar, 1988). When, in line with the precepts 
of conversational inference, they are enjoined to go beyond the 
information given they weight individuating information, whereas 
when they are enjoined to be "scientific", they stick to hard 
facts and figures (Zukier and Pepitone, 1984). This pattern of 
results suggests that subjects typically enter the psychology 
experiment with the default assumption of conversational 
rationality which enjoins them to go beyond the information given 
in making inferences about what is required of them. Importantly, 
however, they can also make inferences which correspond to 
"scientific" norms when their conversational assumptions are 
cancelled by the context. Consequently, the production of bias in 
such tasks may be less attributable to cognitive factors such as 
representativeness (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973) or availability 
(Ginossar and Trope, 1987) than was first thought, and may be 
more attributable to inferences about the social context of the 
experimental message that are guided by conversational 
assumptions.
Attributions of co-operativeness and the effect of leading 
questions
The default assumption made by Grice's (1975) model of 
conversational inference is that utterances are co-operatively 
produced. The attribution of co-operativeness to the speaker is, 
of course, a special case of the attribution of intention. Other 
intentions, including adversative ones, may also be attributed to 
the speaker. As will be suggested below, many "cognitive" 
explanations of biases may have to be supplanted or supplemented 
with "conversational" explanations.
Children, of course, are often subjected to "trick
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questions" in testing situations by adults. Winer, Hemphill and 
Craig (1988) showed that both children and adults give more non­
conserving responses when the question seems to imply that 
conservation is not possible. Thus the question "When do you 
weigh the most, when you are standing or crouching?" seems to 
imply that body weight changes from one state to another, and 
leads to more responses which indicate that the weight changes 
from one state to another than when the question is asked with 
the tag "or do you weigh the same?".
Kwock and Weiner (1987) explored social context variables 
which would lead children to reject misleading questions. 
Children were given classifications tasks, where they were shown 
a picture and asked whether it was X or Y when in fact was both, 
thus, when shown a picture of a dog, children were asked "Is this 
a dog or an animal?" or when shown a picture of a black square 
they were asked "Is this black or a square?". Some children had 
previously been exposed to a training set in which they were 
questions which flagrantly violated conversational norms, e.g. 
they were shown a picture of a couch and asked "Why is this a 
car?". These children were more likely to reject the misleading 
implication of the classification question that the object could 
not be both than children who had not been exposed to the 
questions which violated the rules of conversation. In a second 
experiment, Kwock and Winer (1987) found that third-graders were 
more likely to reject the misleading implication of the question 
when they were asked by another third grader rather than by an 
adult.
Both children and adults are vulnerable to misleading 
questions. Children are less so when the questions are asked by 
low credibility sources, such as other children. In addition, 
children's susceptibility to misleading questions decreases when
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children's susceptibility to misleading questions decreases when 
they have had experience of flagrantly bizarre questions asked by 
the adult, presumably because the credibility of the adult 
experimenter is then undermined (see Siegal, in press, for an 
extensive review).
Conversational inference and the effect of leading questions 
on memory
One of the best-known "framing" effects concerns the effect 
of leading questions on memory. In a classic experiment, Loftus 
and Palmer (1974) showed that the presuppositions loaded into 
questions about an automobile accident affected subjects' memory 
about that accident. Thus, if subjects were asked how fast a car 
was going when it smashed into a truck, they were more likely to 
give a higher estimate of the speed of the car in a subsequent 
memory test than if they had been asked how fast the car had been 
going when it hit the truck. These findings were consistent with 
other results which showed that subjects were inclined to falsely 
accept presuppositions associated with descriptions of scenes, 
even when those presuppositions were not actually true of the 
scenes described (Hornby, 1972; 1974).
However, the effect of leading questions on memory may only 
occur in social settings where the co-operativeness principle is 
assumed to hold valid, such as psychology experiments. Subjects 
may have assumed that the experimenter in Loftus and Palmer's 
(1974) study was co-operative, and have thus uncritically 
accepted the presuppositions loaded in the question. To test this 
interpretation, Dodd and Bradshaw (1980) found no effect of 
leading questions on memory as compared to a control condition 
when the source was specified as "a lawyer representing the 
defendant", although they were able to replicate the original
as in Loftus and Palmer's original procedure.
Dodd and Bradshaw's (1980) results are thus consistent with 
the suggestion that when the leading question was attributed to 
an adversative source, such as a defending lawyer in an American 
court, subjects suspended the assumption of co-operativeness and 
were thus not vulnerable to the biasing effects of leading 
questions. Interestingly, subjects were still vulnerable to 
biasing effects from the recall probes. However, the recall 
probes all emanated from the same source (the experimenter) 
regardless of experimental condition, and thus may still have 
been treated as being guaranteed by the assumption of co­
operativeness, and used to infer the speed of the vehicle. 
Consequently, although the Loftus and Palmer (1974) results are 
typically discussed as demonstrating the effect of cognitive 
biases on memory, they may plausibly be attributed to the 
operation of conversational assumptions, which guide 
reconstructive inferences about the speed of the car.
THE GIVEN-NEW CONTRACT AND THE DETERMINATION OF SPEAKER
FOCUS
Grice's (1975) logic of conversation requires that speakers 
should be brief (satisfying the maxim of manner) and informative 
(satisfying the maxim of quantity). For this reason, speakers 
often do not explicitly refer to old information and treat it as 
given. Correspondingly, hearers are expected to focus on the new 
information contained in an utterance. This expectation is 
sometimes referred to as the "given-new" contract (Clark, 1985).
Part-whole contrasts and children1s learning of names
The given-new contract, and the assumptions behind it, often 
forces contextually based interpretations of what is said. For 
example, Markman and Wachtel (1988) showed 3- and 4-year old
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children a familiar object such as a banana and an unfamiliar one 
such as a lemon wedgepress. Children were then asked "Show me the 
x" where x was a nonsense syllable. Children almost invariably 
selected the unfamiliar object. Clearly, children's reasoning may 
be based on conversational assumptions that a co-operative 
experimenter would have said "Show me the banana" if they had 
wanted the banana, and so the unfamiliar word must refer to the 
unfamiliar object. Only if the adult were violating Grice's maxim 
of manner, and using an obscure, unknown word to refer to the 
banana when a well-known one ("banana") exists, could the adult 
have reasonably intended the nonsense syllable to refer to the 
familiar object.
Markman and Wachtel (1988) extended this procedure to the 
study of part-whole relations. They showed children pictures of 
an object with a salient part. The object (e.g. a lung) was 
either familiar or unfamiliar to the children, whereas the part 
(e.g. trachea) was always unfamiliar. When the object was 
unfamiliar, children tended to treat the new word (i.e. 
"trachea") as referring to the whole object (i.e. lung). However, 
when children already knew the word "lung", they were more likely 
to interpret the unfamiliar word "trachea" as referring to the 
specific part of the lung, i.e. the trachea. Clearly, the 
children may have been reasoning that the adults wished to be 
informative by Grice's maxim of quantity, and name the object 
that they did not know. Otherwise, this particular "conversation" 
would seem to have no point.
Although Markman and Wachtel's (1988) results seem very 
consistent with the application of Gricean rules of inference, 
they do not discuss their studies in these terms. Rather, they 
suggest that children assume that words are mutually exclusive,
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and cannot refer to the same object. Consequently, the unknown 
word must be interpreted as referring to the same object. 
However, because children's interpretation of the referents of 
names can be explained in Gricean terms (cf. the "given-new" 
contract of Clark and Haviland, 1974), there seems to be no need 
to posit a special assumption of "mutual exclusivity" to explain 
children's successful performance on this naming task.
Part-whole contrasts and the interpretation of survey 
questions
Strack, Martin and Schwarz (1986) reasoned that if a 
specific question precedes a general one that logically includes 
it, hearers will interpret the general question to exclude the 
information already mentioned in the first question. Suppose a 
man is asked:
"How is your family?"
He will probably reply on the basis of how his wife and children 
are. If his wife is very well but one of the children is sick, he 
might reply "Quite well on the whole, thank you." If, on the 
other hand, he is asked first:
"How is your wife?" 
and then,
"How is your family?" 
he might interpret the question as referring to that part of his 
family other than his wife. If one of the children is unwell, he 
might now reply "Not too good. I’m afraid".
Strack et al. (1988) applied this reasoning to the analysis 
of seemingly inconsistent responses to survey questions. In one 
condition, which they termed the "conversational context", they 
introduced the two questions by saying "Now, we would like to 
learn about two areas of life that may be important for people's
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overall well-being: (a) happiness with dating, (b) happiness with 
life in general". In this condition, they hypothesised that the 
focus of the general question will be interpreted as excluding 
the focus of the specific question which has been asked first. 
Since answers to the two questions will be based on different 
information there should not be much correlation. When students 
were asked to rate their satisfaction with life in general after 
rating their satisfaction with their dating life, the correlation 
was very low (0.26).
However, when the specific question was asked at the end of 
one page and the general question was asked at the beginning of 
the next page, Strack et al. (1908) reasoned that the two 
questions would not be perceived as being related, and that there 
should be no such "subtraction" effect. Consistent with this 
reasoning, a much higher correlation (.55) was obtained for 
subjects1 ratings of their responses to these two questions in 
this condition. Similar results were obtained by Strack, Schwarz 
and Waenke (in press).
Consequently, seemingly inconsistent responses can be 
explained in terms of conversational pragmatics. Also important 
to note is that the exclusion of the information from the 
preceding question (e.g. about the respondent’s satisfaction with 
his or her marriage) from the response to the subsequent question 
(e.g. about satisfaction with life in general) cannot be 
explained in terms of priming theories. Because the information 
about marriage has been so recently mentioned, it should be 
highly available in memory and thus, according to a 
straightforward priming theory, have more impact on the 
subsequent judgment. Although cognitive accessibility may often 
affect salience, principles of conversational inference can 
override the the application of the availability heuristic (cf.
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override the the application of the availability heuristic (cf 
Strack, in press).
Part-whole contrasts and the conjunction fallacv
Dulany and Hilton (1990) applied this logic to the analysis 
of Tversky and Kahneman's (1983) conjunction fallacy task. In the 
"model" condition of the best known task, subjects read a 
detailed description of a target woman, Linda, who is attributed 
many characteristics associated with being a feminist (single, 
bright, politically radical, etc.) but not a bank teller. In the 
"no model” condition, subjects received only the minimal 
information that Linda is 31 years old. The rich information 
given to the subject in the "model" condition may justify the 
inference that the experimenter knows a lot about the target. The 
subject may reason that if the experimenter knows a lot about the 
target, Linda, then the reason he omitted to say that Linda is 
not active in the feminist movement is because he knows this not 
to be the case, i.e. implying that Linda is not active in the 
feminist movement. By contrast, in the "no-model" condition, the 
subject may reason that the experimenter omitted to say that 
Linda is a bank teller because he does not know whether this is 
the case or not, i.e. implying the logical possibility that Linda 
is or is not a bank teller. Consequently, when the subject is 
asked to judge whether it is more probable that "Linda is a bank 
teller and is active in the feminist movement" and "Linda is a 
bank teller", subjects may be more likely to draw the K- 
implicature that "Linda is a bank teller" implicates "Linda is a 
bank teller who is not active in the feminist movement" in the 
model condition than the no-model condition. In a study that 
elaborates on the above analysis, Dulany and Hilton (1990) found 
that this was indeed so.
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This result has important consequences for Tversky and 
Kahneman's claim that subjects commit the conjunction fallacy in 
this experiment. Subjects in thes experiments reliably judge the 
subset ("Linda is a bank teller and a feminist") to be more 
probable than the whole ("Linda is a bank teller"). Tversky and 
Kahneman argue that this judgment violates a basic rule of 
probability, that an item cannot be more likely to be a member of 
a subset than of the superset which includes the subset. They 
suggest that subjects are misled by the representativeness 
heuristic, whereby the probability of the target person being the 
member of a set is assed by the semantic similarity of the target 
and the set. Because the target description of Linda has more 
features in common with "bank teller and feminist" than "bank 
teller", she is judged to be more probably a member of the subset 
than the inclusive superset. However, many subjects in the model 
condition interpret the statement "Linda is a bank teller" to the 
the implicated conjunct "Linda is a bank teller and is not active 
in the feminist movement", and therefore do not commit the 
conjunction fallacy.
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) acknowledge the above 
possibility, but do not test it directly. Instead, they developed 
a "direct" version of the task in which the extensional nature of 
the conjunct was explicitly stated. Thus subjects were asked to 
judge the probability of "Linda is a bank teller whether or not 
she is active in the feminist movement". However, this solution 
is also unsatisfactory as It could be re-interpreted as "Linda is 
a bank teller even if she is active in the feminist movement", in 
much the same way as "We will go to the zoo tomorrow whether or 
not it rains" can be interpreted as "We will go to the zoo 
tomorrow even if it rains". Dulany and Hilton (1990) developed an 
unambiguous version of the direct test and found less than half
the conjunction fallacies obtained by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1983). Thus it seems that ambiguities in the wording used may 
have led Tversky and Kahneman to overestimate the number of 
conjunction fallacies committed.
Implicit focus and biases in causal explanation
Attribution theorists have long pointed to the existence of 
biases in the explanation process. Two biases in particular are 
the tendencies to attribute others' behavior to characteristics 
of the actor but one's own behavior to the situation (Jones and 
Davis, 1972) and one's own success to oneself but failure to 
external factors (Weiner et al., 1972).
In an intriguing series of studies, McGill (1989) has 
suggested that these biases may be attributable to implicit 
focus. For example, when asked a question about why someone else 
did something, the hearer may assume that the implicit question 
is of the form "Why did x (rather than y) do z?" , whereas when 
asked why they themselves did something, the hearer may assume 
that the implicit question is of the form "Why did I do z (rather 
than y)?". When the implicit focus is overridden by the use of 
explicit focus adjuncts such as "in particular" (Quirk, 
Greenbaum, Svartvik and Leech, 1972), actor-observer differences 
are greatly reduced. Likewise, using a similar procedure 
success/failure asymmetries in explanation can be attenuated 
(McGill, 1989). Consequently, the presence of these biases seems 
to be largely attributable to pragmatic factors shaping the 
interpretation of the causal question.
Use of base-rate information in causal inference tasks
Much attention has been paid to the apparent underuse of 
baserate information, particularly consensus information, in
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causal attribution tasks (Alloy and Tabachnik, 1984; Higgins and
Bargh, 1987; Kassin, 1979; McArthur, 1972; 1976; Nisbett and
Borgida, 1975; Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall and Reed, 1976; Nisbett
and Ross, 1980). However, recent research has suggested that
these findings may be more the product of experimental artefacts
than of deficient judgment strategies. In properly designed
experiments, subjects quite clearly use consensus information in
the manner predicted by a strict interpretation of Kelley's
(1967) ANOVA model (Cheng and Novick, 1990; F<irsterling, 1989;
1990; Iacobucci and McGill, in press).
Here I briefly illustrate how taking a "conversational”
perspective enables understanding of how base-rate information
is used in attributional inference (see Hilton, 1990, for
elaboration). Subjects seem to employ knowledge of base-rate
information in the form of knowledge of whether an event normally
happens or not. For example, when given the following target
event together with high consensus, low distinctiveness, high
consistency (HLH) information configuration:
Sally buys something on her visit to the supermarket
Almost everyone else buys something on their visit to the 
supermarket
Sally buys something on her visit to almost every other 
supermarket
In the past, Sally has almost always bought something on her 
visit to this supermarket
subjects appear to assume that Most people buy something on most
visits to most supermarkets. This information can be used to fill
the "cells" necessary to perform an analysis of variance on the
effect of the person (Sally) and the stimulus (the supermarket)
on the behaviour (shopping). In order to perform an analysis of
variance to test for the causal effect of the person and the
stimulus in a 2x2 design, four cells of information are needed
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(see Table 3). In this example the consistency dimension has been
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
omitted to simplify exposition. Subjects only receive information 
in three of the four necessary cells in experiments such as those 
of McArthur (1972). Thus, using "1" to indicate that the effect 
normally occurs in a given cell and "0" to indicate that it does 
not, we can see that all the cells in this case are filled with a 
"1". According to a normative analysis of variance there is no 
effect of either the person or the stimulus in this case. And 
this indeed corresponds to what subjects say; they attribute the 
event to "Nothing special about Sally, the supermarket, the 
present occasion (or any combination of the three)" in this 
condition.
When a target event with a different "norm" or presupposed
base-rate is used, a different picture emerges, consider the high
consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency (HLH)
configuration below:
Ralph trips up over Linda dancing
Almost everyone else trips up over Linda dancing
Ralph trips up over almost everyone else dancing
In the past, Ralph has almost always tripped up over Linda
dancing
Here the norm cell may be filled with a "1/2" to signify that 
"People sometimes trip up over other people dancing". The other 
cells are filled as in the above supermarket example. Here, a 
normative analysis of variance would indicate two main effects 
attributable to the person (Ralph) and the stimulus (Linda). And 
indeed, this is subjects' preferred response in this category: 
they attribute the behaviour to "Something about Ralph and 
something about Linda (even when they are not together)".
In sum, subjects have assumed that their own world knowledge 
is relevant and have used it to fill out "missing cells" of
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information that have not been explicitly supplied by the 
experimenter. Paradoxically, it is the experimenter who has 
omitted base-rate information in these experiments and the 
subjects who have both supplied it and used it in line with the 
normative predictions of the analysis of variance. When the 
experimenter explicitly mentions information in the "missing 
cells", subjects use the explicitly mentioned information in the 
manner specified by an analysis of variance (Cheng and Novick, 
1990; Forsterling, 1989; 1990; Pruitt and Insko, 1980). Failure 
to find the results predicted by a normative analysis of variance 
in previous experiments (McArthur, 1972; 1976; Orvis, Cunningham 
and Kelley, 1975) seems in part to have been due to a failure to 
appreciate the role of subjects’ presuppositions in "completing 
the design" of information given to subjects in these experiments 
(cf. Hilton, 1988; 1990).
More generally, these results are consistent with findings 
which suggest that people adjust their estimations of the 
probabilities indicated by probability words such as "likely" and 
"possible" to reflect the a priori probability of that event 
occurring (Wallsten, Fillenbaum and Cox, 1986; Weber and Hilton, 
in press).
THE RELEVANCE OF "INCIDENTAL" INFORMATION
Grice's (1975) maxim of relevance enjoins speakers to be 
relevant. Speakers should not mention irrelevant information. 
Thus, hearers are entitled to assume that all the information 
given to them is relevant to the task in hand, and, according to 
the maxim of quality, not misleading in any way. However, 
experimenters often include "irrelevant" information which may in 
fact be used by subjects to interpret their experimental task. As 
will be shown below, such "irrelevant" information may be
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conveyed through the kinds of dependent measures used, or through 
interpretations of the independent variables that were not 
intended by the experimenter.
The relevance of the range and phrasing of response sets: A 
re-examination of attribution experiments
As noted above, it is often claimed that subjects "underuse" 
consensus information (Higgins and Bargh, 1987; Kassin, 1979; 
McArthur, 1972; 1976; Nisbett and Borgida, 1975; Nisbett and 
Ross, 1980). One reason for this claim is that in an influential 
study, McArthur (1972; 1976) found little influence of consensus 
information on attributions. However, Hilton (1990b) has 
suggested that this pattern may be the result of methodological 
artefacts. One factor of key importance is McArthur's (1972; 
1976) failure to specify interactional attributions in her 
response format. Subjects were given "main effect" attributions 
to the person, stimulus or circumstances to select, or were asked 
to write any interactional attributions in a space provided. 
This, in combination with her use of the ambiguous term "the 
circumstances" may have caused subjects not to make predicted 
interactional attributions to combinations of factors (e.g. the 
person and the occasion). Subjects may have taken the lack of 
interactional attributions explicitly specified in the response 
format as a cue not to produce them, and may have also used "the 
circumstances" to indicate interactional attributions. Studies 
which did give a full range of interactional attributions in the 
response format found 61% (Jaspars, 1983) and 47% (Hilton and 
Jaspars, 1987) interactional attributions, whereas studies which 
did not use such response formats found only 37% (McArthur, 1972) 
and 35% (Hewstone and Jaspars, 1983) interactional attributions. 
Together with other problems, the data collected by McArthur 
(1972) may have been systematically biased (Hilton, 1990b).
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Studies which used full response formats show the predicted 
effect of consensus information on person attribution (Cheng and 
Novick, 1990; Forsterling, 1989; 1990; Hilton and Jaspars, 1987; 
Jaspars, 1983). Consequently the original finding that consensus 
information is underused may be attributable to methodological 
problems, in part caused by how subjects interpreted the response 
sets that they were given (Hilton, 1990b).
The relevance of information contained in response scales
Although experimenters generally use response scales in 
order to assess subjects' judgments and not to influence them, 
there is considerable evidence that subjects often use response 
scales as cues about the character and extent of the behaviour 
probed (Schwarz, in press).
For example, the range indicated by the response scale may 
cue subjects' interpretation of the behaviour. Schwarz et al. 
(1988) asked subjects how often they had felt "really irritated" 
recently. One group of subjects was given a scale ranging from 
"several times daily" to "less than once a week" whereas other 
subjects were given a scale ranging from "several times a year to 
less than once every three months". Schwarz et a l . argued that 
subjects would use their world knowledge to decide what kind of 
irritations were implied by the experimenter's question. 
Consistent with their reasoning, subjects given the former scale 
reported less extreme examples of irritation (e.g. having to wait 
for service in a restaurant). Subjects given the latter scale 
reported more extreme examples of irritation (e.g. having a fight 
with one's spouse).
Subjects may also use response scales to decide the likely 
frequency of a target behaviour. For example, Schwarz et a l . 
(1985) asked German adults to rate how frequently they watched
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television- Half the subjects received a scale ranging in half- 
hour steps from "up to 1/2 hour" to "more than 2 1/2 hours", 
while the other half received a scale ranging from "up to 2 1/2 
hours" to "more than 4 1/2 hours". Only 16.2 % of the subjects 
who were presented the low frequency scale reported watching TV 
for more than 2 1/2 hours whereas 37.5% of the subjects presented 
the high frequency scale did so. Similar effects of range of 
response alternatives for estimations of sexual intercourse and 
masturbation in dating couples (Schwarz and Scheuring, 1988).
It might be conjectured that the effect of scale ranges on 
frequency estimation may reflect "anchoring" effects (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). However, subjects' susceptibility to the effect 
of scale ranges is mediated by their knowledgeability of the 
topic in question. Thus U.S. college students were least likely 
to be biased by scale ranges when estimating their own or a 
friend's frequency of watching television than when estimating 
the TV consumption of a "typical" undergraduate. Moreover, 
college students who are high on private self-consciousness 
(Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss, 1975) are less likely to be 
influenced by scale ranges than students low on private self- 
consciousness This is consistent with the view that high private 
self-consciousness individuals are more likely to know how often 
they watch television.
Comparable results were obtained by Joyce and Biddle (1981). 
They showed that trained accountants were not subject to 
anchoring effects on an auditing task when they themselves 
provided the anchors. Self-provided anchors cannot provide 
information about the experimenter's estimate of the frequency of 
a behaviour in the target population. However, trained 
accountants were still susceptible to anchoring effects on tasks
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where the experimenter did provide the anchors (Joyce and Biddle, 
1981).
In sum, these results suggest that when subjects do not have 
direct access to the frequency information required they use the 
frequency range provided by the experimenter to estimate the 
likely frequency of a behaviour in the population, which they 
then use to calculate their response, e.g. as to their position 
on that scale. Subjects' responses seem to be guided by a 
strategy of guessing on the basis of the response scales having 
been provided by a co-operative experimenter who does not wish to 
mislead the subject about the likely range of responses in the 
population studied. "Cognitive'' explanations based on anchoring 
and adjustment cannot explain why self-provided anchors are 
ineffective, or why experimenter-provided anchors are most 
effective in domains which the subject knows little about.
The relevance of nondi agnostic information
Although Grice's (1975) maxim of relation prescribes that 
speakers should only include relevant information, experimenters 
routinely violate this assumption by deliberately including 
information that is meant to be irrelevant to the task in hand. A 
clear example of this is the "dilution" effect studied by 
Nisbett, Zukier and Lemley (1981). Given diagnostic information 
relevant to some attribute (e.g. grade point average, being a 
child abuser), subjects rationally used that information to judge 
the probability of the target person possessing the target 
attribute. However, when the description of the target person 
included information that was not relevant to the judgment task 
in hand, subjects made less use of the diagnostic information. 
There is no rational reason for this, as the diagnostic 
information is still as predictive when presented with
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nondiagnostic information as when presented alone. Nisbett et al. 
(1981) posit an intrapsychic explanation in terms of the 
representativeness heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), 
attributing this effect to the dilution of the 
"representativeness" of the description of the target person of 
the target category (cf. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
However as Tetlock and Boettger (1989) point out, the effect 
is also consistent with an explanation in terms of conversational 
inference. Subjects may assume that all the information that they 
are given, whether diagnostic or nondiagnostic, is relevant. They 
may therefore weight all the information as "diagnostic". On the 
assumption that nondiagnostic information is weighted negatively, 
the "dilution" effect would be observed. Although still an 
"error", this effect would not be attributed to faulty reasoning 
due to the application of the representativeness heuristic, but 
due to faulty assumptions about the diagnosticity of the 
information presented by the experimenter. As Tetlock and 
Boettger (1989) suggest, these explanations need to be 
disentangled by experiments which dissuade subjects from using a 
"conversational" mental set in such experiments.
Pragmatic inferences and stimulus vocabulary choice
Some pragmatic phenomena are not determined by inferences 
about the speaker's intended meaning derived through application 
of Grice's principles (Levinson, 1983). These include inferences 
about focus determined through "pragmatic particles". Pragmatic 
particles such as "and", "but", "few", "a few", "occasionally" 
and "seldom" conventionally determine the interpretation of 
words they are conjoined with as well as having truth values 
which determine their own range of applicability. For example, 
although "seldom" and "occasionally" indicate approximately the
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same frequency of occurrence of a behaviour, and thus have the 
same truth values. However, although similar in semantic terms, 
they have different pragmatic properties. Thus they focus 
attention on different aspects of the behaviour (Moxey and 
Sanford, 1987). Thus if we are asked to explain why John seldom 
walks the dog we are apt to come up with reasons for the non- 
occurrence of the behaviour (e.g. "Because he is always busy"), 
whereas if asked to explain why he occasionally walks the dog we 
tend to give reasons which account for the occurrence of the 
behaviour (e.g. "Because he likes the exercise").
Experimental psychologists and survey researchers who are 
not aware of the functions of pragmatic particles are liable to 
produce unintended effects or to misattribute effects that they 
obtain. An example can be seen to be in the stimulus material 
used by Kahneman and Miller (1986) to test norm theory. Kahneman 
and Miller (1986) argue that unusual events are more likely to 
activate counterfactual alternatives in which the non-occurrence 
of the target event is brought to mind. However, if an 
experimenter describes an event as "seldom" rather than 
"occasionally" happening, then this would serve as a cue to the 
subject to focus on why the event did not happen rather than did 
happen, regardless of the actual normality of the event. Such is 
the case in one of the stimulus passages used by Kahneman and 
Miller (1986). Hence one cannot be sure whether the effects 
obtained are attributable to the normality of the events 
described or to the focus indicated by the speaker's choice of 
temporal quantifier.
A related effect may be the "forbid/allow" asymmetry studied 
by Hippier and Schwarz (1987). Forbidding something and not 
allowing something appear to be semantically similar; they would 
seem to be true of the same kind of event. However, survey
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respondents are much more likely to agree, for example, that 
peepshows should not be allowed than that they should be 
forbidden (Hippier and Schwarz, 1987). Although it is not 
altogether clear why the forbid/allow asymmetry should exist, it 
is clear that seemingly irrelevant changes in phrasing which 
appear to preserve the literal meaning of the target stimulus 
nevertheless change the meaning conveyed to the subject.
Speaker goals and judgment
The research reviewed so far has mainly focused on how the 
hearer's perceptions of the speaker's goals, as mediated by 
attributions, affects the speaker's interpretation of the 
information given and judgment. However, a further direction for 
research is to investigate how the speaker's own goals affect 
infernce and judgment. Thus Sedikides (1990) has shown that the 
effect of primes on impression formation obtained by Higgins and 
King (1977) and many others (for reviews see Bargh, 1984; Higgins 
and Bargh, 1987) only emerges under "non-communicator" 
conditions. When subjects are told that they are going to be 
required to communicate their impression of the target person to 
a third party, the primed concept appears to have no influence on 
the impression they report of the target person. Thus the role of 
the subject's own communicational goals, as well as the subject's 
perception of the experimenter's communicational goals, should 
merit investigation.
CONCLUSIONS
The attributional model of conversational inference 
presented above underscores the role of social context in 
utterance comprehension. In particular it explains how hearers' 
assumptions about utterances, as modelled by Grice's (1975)
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maxims of conversation, may be governed by attributions they make 
about the speaker's co-operativeness, intentionality, competence 
and so on. As such the attributional model goes beyond most 
previous work (see Clark, 1985; Kraut and Higgins, 1984; for 
reviews) which notes the relations between Grice's (1975) maxims 
of conversation and inference processes, but does not explain how 
deployment of these assumptions can be modified by the hearer's 
attributions about the speaker. As such, the attributional model 
of conversational inference conforms with recent work which 
demonstrates that utterance interpretation is affected by the 
hearer's beliefs about the speaker (Slugoski and Turbull, 1988).
Implications of conversational inference for the thesis of 
negative rationality
The attributional model of conversational inference has 
important implications for research on human judgment and 
decision-making. Experimental psychological research does not 
take place in a social vacuum (cf. Orne, 1962). In particular, 
because conversational inference is inductive in nature 
(Levinson, 1983; Sperber and Wilson, 1986), routinely requiring 
listeners to go beyond the information given, experimental 
psychologists need to give careful attention to this issue in 
evaluating the results of experiments using verbal materials. 
According to the logic of conversation, subjects may interpret 
what is said to them in particular ways and be justified in 
adding extra premises which seem to be relevant to what is said. 
Since, in normal conversation, it is usually expected that such 
additional assumptions should be taken into account, subjects are 
often warranted in transforming their judgment task into 
something different to that which has been explicitly given to 
them.
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The inductive nature of conversational inference poses a 
general problem for the metaphysical assumptions of workers 
interested in assessing errors in human judgment. This is because 
such workers normally assume that the "correct" answer can be 
determined by applying a normative model to the explicitly given 
data set. The inference task is thus essentially deductive in 
nature; given the premises the "correct" answer can be deduced. 
However, according to conversational inference it is rational to 
add to or re-interpret the information given, subject to Gricean 
assumptions. Consequently, the overall experimental task, of 
forming a representation of the information given and of 
reasoning from that represenation also becomes inductive in 
nature. In assessing the overall rationality of the subject's 
response, the experimenter has to take the rationality of his or 
her interpretation of the task into account, as well as the 
rationality of his or her reasoning processes.
It is easy to see that most researchers on rationality 
conceive of the experimental task in essentially "deductive" 
terms. Thus those researchers interested in demonstrating that 
human judgment may be irrational generally operate according to 
the canons of "negative rationality" (Rommetveit, 1978). That is, 
they establish a normative model of judgment for some task, 
usually based on an analogy with a scientific or logical model. 
Thus, the Bayesian inference procedure is frequently used as a 
normative model for belief updating, and reversible logical 
operations for reasoning about conservation tasks. Researchers 
then perform an experiment that demonstrates that people do not 
produce the judgment predicted by the normative model. Deviations 
from the normative model may then be classified as errors of 
judgment. These are taken to suggest that the subject is using 
some logically suboptimal judgment procedure such as a
"heuristic" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) or is overly influenced 
by irrelevant cues, such as the perceptual appearance of objects 
of judgment (e.g. Inhelder and Piaget, 1958).
The "negative rationality" perspective has been adopted in 
studies of many different domains of judgment. Sometimes, the 
comparison to a normative scientific or formal logical model is 
quite explicit. One example is probability judgment, where 
judgments are compared to Bayesian models (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974) and the conjunction rule (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983), 
revealing, respectively, seemingly irrational tendencies to 
under-use base-rate information and to judge a conjunction to be 
more probable than its conjunct. A second example is the "child 
scientist" perspective in developmental psychology, where the 
child's cognitive development is characterised in terms of 
attainment of formal logical competences, such as the use of 
reversible operations (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958) or the concept 
of mutual exclusivity (Markman and Wachtel, 1988). A third 
example is the "man the scientist" perspective in attribution 
theory (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967) based on an analogy of lay 
inference with Mill's (1872/1973) methods of induction and their 
derivate, the scientific analysis of variance (ANOVA). This 
perspective has revealed apparent deficiencies in the "lay 
scientist", such as the underuse of consensus information and a 
tendency to overattribute effects to the person (e.g. Nisbett and 
Ross, 1980). A final example comes in Wason and Johnson-Laird's 
(1972) programme of research into the psychology of reasoning, 
where subjects' reasoning patterns were compared unfavourably 
with normative models based on formal logic and Popper's (1972) 
philosophy of science.
In addition, the study of "framing effects" (e.g. Tversky
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and Kahneman, 1981) can also be seen to take the perspective of 
"negative rationality”. This is because the production of 
seemingly inconsistent responses through ostensibly irrelevant 
changes in the wording of a question or the context in which it 
is asked appeals to the implicit equation between "being 
consistent" and "being logical" (cf. Strawson, 1952). 
Consequently, studies of memory reports (Loftus and Palmer, 1974) 
and attitude and opinion reports (Hippier and Schwarz, 1987; 
Krosnick and Alwin, 1987) which suggest that the wording or 
context of a question may lead to inconsistent responses may also 
be treated as taking the "negative rationality" perspective from 
the present perspective.
In addition, although not usually described as errors, many 
judgmental effects which have traditionally attributed to 
cognitive biases may in fact reflect the operation of 
conversational assumptions. One example is Brown’s (1986) 
insightful analysis of Asch's (1946) impression formation 
paradigm which suggests that both the primacy and centrality 
effects can be attributed to the operation of a principle of 
information gain consistent with that of the maxim of quantity. 
Thus information which is presented earlier rather than later 
(primacy) and information which is semantically rich but 
nonredundant with what has gone before (centrality) is likely to 
have more effect on the impression formed.
While particular attention has been paid to the re- 
interpretation of experimental results that have been attributed 
to faulty reasoning, it is not claimed that subjects never make 
bona fide errors of reasoning. Rather, it is argued that 
specification of these inference processes should enable 
researchers to identify cases where mistakes may be attributable 
to conversationally-guided interpretations of the judgment task,
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as opposed to cases where mistakes are due to genuine errors of 
reasoning- Rather than deny the applicability of normative models 
to judgment tasks, the conversational inference model is intended 
to help provide a systematic framework in which claims about the 
rationality of human judgment in such tasks can be assessed.
Nor is it claimed here that the conversational inference 
model provides the only constraint on claims of "negative 
rationality". Other perspectives are possible and valid. One 
approach has been to accept that heuristics or logically 
suboptimal "rules of thumb" are employed, but that they are 
employed flexibly and rationally with an eye to the costs and 
benefits of accurate inference, and are thus normative (Payne, in 
press). Others have drawn attention to the question of whether 
the experimental tasks used are truly representative of real-life 
decision tasks (e.g. Funder, 1987; Hogarth, 1981; Tetlock, 1985). 
Sometimes it can be suggested that an alternative normative model 
of judgment can describe subjects' patterns of reasoning, as when 
Cohen (1979) suggested a Baconian model of judgment as an 
alternative to the Bayesian model used by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974).
However, attention to the social context of experiments and 
surveys should lead to a better understanding of which effects 
are attributable to "conversational" factors and which are 
attributable to other factors. For example, "conversational" re­
interpretations of questions may be avoided by manipulations 
undermining the assumption of intentionality, such as informing 
subjects of the randomness of the order in which information is 
given or questions are asked. Alternatively, the production of 
responses may be controlled by explicitly instructing subjects to 
either maximize the maxim of quality or the maxim of quantity.
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Indeed, one significant advantage of the conversational 
perspective is that it enables one to see where a normative model 
of judgment proper has been incorrectly applied and 
inappropriately tested. Thus, sensitivity to pragmatic 
constraints on the interpretation of causal questions has enabled 
researchers to argue that subjects follow Mill's canons of 
induction in causal attribution much more closely than was 
previously thought (Cheng and Novick, 1990; Forsterling, 1989; 
Hilton, 1988; 1990). Examples such as these underscore the 
intimate relationship between logic and ordinary language, and 
the important insights into human thought processes to be gained 






























Table 2: Assumed characteristics of message and speaker implied 
bv Grice1s logic of conversation
The Co-operative Principle
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which 
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk 
exchange in which you are engaged.
The Maxim of Quality
Try to make your contribution one that you believe to be true, 
specifically:
(1) Do not say what you believe to be false
(2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
The Maxim of Quantity
(1) Make your contribution as informative as is required for the 
current purposes of the exchange.
(2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is 
required
The Maxim of Relation
Make your contributions relevant





Table 1 : Grice 1s (1975) Co-operative Principle and the Maxims of
Conversation
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Target event 'SaJJy buys something on her visit to the supermarket’ 
Explanation: 'Nothing special about Sally or the supermarket'
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Kev : P- Target person present, P •  Other target persons present 
S -  Target stimulus present. S' -  Other target stimuli present
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